Ciao!
I am the August Family Assistant Professor of Economics at Brown University. Previously, I was a Postdoctoral Associate at MIT Economics. I hold a PhD in Economics from the University of Zurich.
My research is at the intersection of development economics and behavioral economics. I am interested in how the social environment influences the economic behavior of individuals and organizations in poor countries.
I am an affiliate of the Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD) and the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).
I am on sabbatical at Princeton (RPDE) for the 2025-26 academic year.
- I wrote a guide on how to run IRR experiments in poor countries: here.
- My paper on obesity in poor countries is in the New York Times!
We study the mental health of graduate students and faculty at 14 Economics departments in Europe. Using clinically validated surveys sent out in the fall of 2021, we find that 34.7% of graduate students experience moderate to severe symptoms of depression or anxiety and 17.3% report suicidal or self-harm ideation in a two-week period. Only 19.2% of students with significant symptoms are in treatment. 15.8% of faculty members experience moderate to severe depression or anxiety symptoms, with prevalence higher among non-tenure track (42.9%) and tenure track (31.4%) faculty than tenured (9.6%) faculty. We estimate that the COVID-19 pandemic accounts for about 74% of the higher prevalence of depression symptoms and 30% of the higher prevalence of anxiety symptoms in our European sample relative to a 2017 U.S. sample of economics graduate students. We also document issues in the work environment, including a high incidence of sexual harassment, and make recommendations for improvement.
This study explores the economic implications of obesity in low-income countries, where it serves as an unhealthy yet significant status symbol. By conducting experiments with decision-makers in Kampala, Uganda, who were shown portraits with manipulated weight, the research uncovers four key insights. Firstly, obesity is predominantly viewed as an indicator of wealth rather than attractiveness or health. Secondly, obesity enhances credit access; in a practical experiment with loan officers, the advantage of obesity equates to a 60% increase in reported earnings. Thirdly, the obesity premium diminishes when additional financial information is available, highlighting the role of asymmetric information. Lastly, the perceived benefits of obesity and its value as a wealth signal are often exaggerated, which inadvertently increases the cost of adopting healthier lifestyles.
with Alessandro Borin, Michele Mancini
The future of an institution, such as the European Union, ultimately depends on people’s support. This paper investigates whether EU redistributive policies have improved public attitudes towards European integration, both in terms of public opinion and political preferences. We focus on Cohesion Policy funds, whose allocation allows us to single out these effects by means of a regression discontinuity approach. The results show that EU transfers have mitigated the rise of Eurosceptical attitudes and reduced political consensus for anti-EU parties. The effects are homogeneous across different socio-economic groups, including the most disadvantaged ones. The improvement in public support for the EU does not appear to be exclusively a spillover of the positive economic effect of funding; we show evidence suggesting the existence of a ‘reciprocity-effect’ channel, i.e. citizens in recipient regions recognize the beneficial role of the EU as the source of funding.
with Jeremia Stalder
Agosto 23
This paper examines informal redistribution in the form of work in small and medium enterprises in Kampala, Uganda and its drivers. Using a field experiment, we show that employers and workers systematically choose giving/receiving work over cash transfers. Decisions imply a large willingness to pay for work on both sides of the labor market. Work redistribution choices are unaffected by the economic and training value of the task, and employers pay for zero marginal product work. Removing stakes in the game also does not affect decisions, ruling out signaling and relational personal benefits as drivers. Employers and workers motivate work redistribution mostly with fairness considerations and, secondly, with the psychosocial value of work for workers. Results appear externally valid, as giving via work predicts increased hiring in the firm, but it does not lead to higher revenues, sales, or profits, confirming that work redistribution is unlikely to be productive.
with Claude Raisaro
Agosto 23
We offer 921 Ugandan employers from three male-dominated sectors opportunities to hire male and female trainees under business-as-usual conditions and two randomly assigned monitoring regimes: audits targeting worker misbehavior/stealing and audits targeting workplace safety/harassment. These employers face monitoring constraints and perceive women as more trustworthy---the most valued yet hardest-to-find worker trait--- but worry about women's harassment risk. Under business-as-usual, we observe a modest hiring gender gap, aligned with a stated unmet demand for female workers. Behavior audits reduce the demand for women workers and increase the hiring gender gap by 63%, especially among employers with stronger stated preferences for hiring women. Safety audits increase the demand for women and close the gap. Using randomized variation in technical skill signals, we show that these gaps are inconsistent with belief-based discrimination based on technical skills; moreover, employers’ beliefs are also systematically inaccurate. However, estimates of bias vary widely depending on which attributes are considered productive.
Agosto 23
The incentivized ratings design \citep{kessler2019incentivized} has emerged as a transparent and incentive-compatible alternative to correspondence and audit studies for measuring discrimination and eliciting decision-makers’ preferences. While originally implemented in online hiring settings in the U.S., I argue that its structure is especially well suited to contexts where decisions are made in person and where traditional audit methods are infeasible ---features common in developing countries. This article reviews the expanding body of research using incentivized ratings, highlights conceptual innovations, and synthesizes lessons across 38 studies conducted between 2019 and 2025. Drawing on these applications and on my field implementations, I provide practical guidance on implementing this design in low-resource settings.
Teaching and Office Hours
I am on sabbatical at Princeton University for the 2025-2026 academic year.
I am happy to chat — email me to schedule an appointment.
I can meet in 125 Julis Romo Rabinowitz or on Zoom. When you reach out, please mention where you would like to meet and what you would like to discuss.


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